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Three formal approaches to public knowledge are “any fool” knowl-
edge by McCarthy (1970), Common Knowledge by Halpern and Moses
(1990), and Justified Knowledge by Artemov (2004). We compare
them to mathematically address the observation that the light-weight
systems of Justified Knowledge and ‘any fool knows’ suffice to solve
standard epistemic puzzles for which heavier solutions based on Com-
mon Knowledge are offered by standard textbooks. Specifically we
show that epistemic systems with Common Knowledge modality C
are conservative with respect to Justified Knowledge systems on for-
mulas χ∧Cϕ → ψ, where χ, ϕ, and ψ are C-free. We then notice that
formalization of standard epistemic puzzles can be made in the afore-
mentioned form, hence each time there is a solution within a Common
Knowledge system, there is a solution in the corresponding Justified
Knowledge system.
1 Multi-agent Logics
The logics Tn, S4n, and S5n are logics in which each of the finitely many (n)
agents has a knowledge operator Ki which is T, or S4, or S5 respectively.
We only consider cases where all agents’ modalities are of the same logical
strength.
Definition 1. The formal systems for Tn, S4n, and S5n are as follows:
propositional logic plus for Ki, i = 1, 2, . . . , n we have
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Axioms for S4n:
K : Ki(ϕ → ψ)→(Kiϕ → Kiψ) each agent can do modus ponens
T : Kiϕ → ϕ agents can know only true propositions
4 : Kiϕ → KiKiϕ agents have positive introspection
Rules:
Necessitation: ` ϕ ⇒ ` Kiϕ
For Tn, omit the final axiom.
For S5n, add negative introspection: ¬Kiϕ → Ki¬Kiϕ.
Definition 2. Kripke models for S4n: M = 〈W, R1, R2, . . . , Rn, °〉 where
• W is a non-empty set of worlds
• Ri ⊆ W×W is agent i’s accessability relation. Ri is reflexive and transitive.
• ° ⊆ W × V ar where V ar is the set of propositional variables. The forcing
relation ° is naturally extended to all formulas so that Ri corresponds to Ki:
M,u ° Kiϕ ⇔ ∀v ∈ M uRiv → M, v ° ϕ .
For Tn-models, each Ri is reflexive while for S5n-models, each Ri is an equiv-
alence relation.
Theorem 1. Tn, S4n, and S5n are sound and complete with respect to their
models, as shown in [FHMV95].
Multi-agent systems are enhanced by the addition of modalities which take
into account the public knowledge of agents. Three such modalities C, J , and
O will be discussed, all of which model variations of public information. We
will compare their logical strengths, semantics, and complexity and will see
why justified knowledge (J) systems are sufficient to solve classical epistemic
puzzles, a role usually designated for common knowledge (C).
2 Common Knowledge
The most recognized conception of public knowledge is common knowledge,
and the literature addressing it, both philosophical (notably [L69]) and math-
ematical, is vast. Informally, the epistemic operator Cϕ, to be read ‘ϕ is
common knowledge,’ can be given as infinite conjunction:
Cϕ ↔ ϕ ∧ Eϕ ∧ E2ϕ ∧ E3ϕ ∧ · · · ∧ Enϕ . . .
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where Eϕ = K1ϕ∧K2ϕ∧. . .∧Knϕ (everyone knows ϕ) and Ki is an individual
agent’s knowledge operator corresponding to T, S4 or S5 as appropriate. One
formal characterization which [FHMV95] and [vBS04] take is via a Fixed
Point Axiom
Cϕ ↔ E (ϕ ∧ Cϕ)
and the Induction Rule
ϕ → E (ϕ ∧ ψ)
ϕ → Cψ
yielding common knowledge to be the greatest fixed point solution [FHMV95].
Common knowledge does not take into account the means by which the
knowledge is acquired. As we will see, this is in contrast to justified knowl-
edge. The distinction between the infinite conjunction, the fixed point axiom,
and how common knowledge is achieved is addressed in [Bar88]. [G92] too,
provides a useful survey with several nice examples but does not include a
distinct formalism. There is also an equivalent axiomatic formulation of com-
mon knowledge which replaces the induction rule with the induction axiom
in [MvdH95], which, for technical convenience, we will use.
Definition 3. TCn , S4
C





T, S4, or S5 axioms for Ki, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, respectively;
K: C(ϕ → ψ) → (Cϕ → Cψ);
T: Cϕ → ϕ;
Cϕ → E(Cϕ), where Eϕ = K1ϕ ∧K2ϕ ∧ · · · ∧Knϕ ;
Induction Axiom: ϕ ∧ C(ϕ → Eϕ) → Cϕ .
Rules:
Necessitation for all Ki: ` ϕ ⇒ ` Kiϕ;
Necessitation for C: ` ϕ ⇒ ` Kiϕ .
Definition 4. Models for TCn , S4
C
n , and S5
C
n : M = 〈W,R1, R2, . . . , Rn, RC ,°〉
where
•M = 〈W,R1, R2, . . . , Rn °〉 is a Tn, S4n, or S5n model, respectively








• The forcing relation ° is naturally extended to all formulas so that RC
corresponds to C: M, u ° Cϕ ⇔ ∀v ∈ M uRCv → M, v ° ϕ.
Theorem 2. TCn , S4
C
n , and S5
C
n are sound and complete with respect to their
models.
Proof. One can be found in [FHMV95], beginning on p. 70.
The agents’ logic plays a role in determining the strength of the common
knowledge operator C. In the systems defined above, C is always at least as




n , and S5
C
n , C satisfies the T, S4, and
S5 axioms, respectively, is given as an exercise in [FHMV95], p. 93.
3 Justified Knowledge
Justified knowledge was introduced by Artemov in [A04] as the forgetful pro-
jection of the evidence-based knowledge represented by an appropriate adap-
tation of LP (Logic of Proofs). In LP systems (TnLP, S4nLP, S5nLP), each
formula / subformula carries with it a proof term representing a particular
proof of the formula / subformula from the axioms. Justified knowledge sys-
tems are ones in which all proofs are identified as one. Whereas Cϕ asserts
that ϕ is common knowledge, Jϕ asserts that ϕ is common knowledge aris-
ing from a proof of ϕ or some other agreed-upon acceptable set of evidences.
Though the proof of ϕ is not explicitly presented with the assertion Jϕ, it is
reproducible. This is the important Realization Theorem which provides an
algorithm to reconstruct proof terms. For more details on this, the reader
should consult [A04, A06].
As with the common knowledge logics, the construction of the justified




n builds on the multi-agent logics. In C
systems the agents’ logic determines the strength of C while in J systems
the strength of J is chosen independently to be weaker, stronger, or the same
as that of the agents’. In the aforementioned logics, the modality J will be
assumed to be S4 unless otherwise specified.







T, S4, or S5 axioms for Ki, i = 1, 2, . . . , n ;
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S4 axioms for J ;
Connection Principle: Jϕ → Kiϕ .
Rules:
Necessitation for all Ki: ` ϕ ⇒ ` Kiϕ ;
Necessitation for J : ` ϕ ⇒ ` Jϕ .




n: M = 〈W,R1, R2, . . . , Rn, RJ ,°〉
where
• M = 〈W,R1, R2, . . . , Rn °〉 is a Tn, S4n, or S5n model, respectively





) ⊆ RJ .
• The forcing relation ° is naturally extended to all formulas so that RJ
corresponds to J : M,u ° Jϕ ⇔ ∀v ∈ M uRJv → M, v ° ϕ.




n are sound and complete with respect to their
models, as shown in [A04, A06].
Recall that in common knowledge models, RC = Transitive Closure(
⋃n
i=1 Ri)
and so RC ⊆ RJ . Thus in a context where we can compare the two, i.e. a
hybrid model with both RC and RJ , it seems Jϕ ⇒ Cϕ but not vice versa.
More formally, we have the following propositions.
Definition 7. Let ϕ∗ be ϕ with each instance of a J replaced by a C.
Proposition 1. (S4Jn)
∗ ⊂ S4Cn but (S4Jn)∗ 6= S4Cn .
Proof. It needs to be shown that the ∗-translation of each each rule and
axiom of S4Jn is provable in S4
C
n . Artemov shows this in [A04, A06] using the
equivalent axiomatization of S4Cn from [FHMV95].
The proof shows it is only the Induction Axiom of S4Cn which is not
provable in (S4Jn)
∗, yielding the strict inclusion.
Corollary 1. Let I.A. be the induction axiom. Then
S4Cn ≡ (S4Jn)∗ + I.A. and TCn ≡ (TJn)∗ + I.A. where J is an S4 modality.
S5Cn ≡ (S5Jn)∗ + I.A. when J is an S5 modality.
S5Jn where J is a S5 modality was considered in [R06].
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Proof. The strict inclusion of the J systems follows from the previous propo-
sition and noticing that C satisfies the 4 axiom in TCn and the 5 axiom in
S5Cn . When the induction axiom is added, the equivalence is clear.
Thus indeed, in any J-model, Jϕ ⇒ Cϕ. The evidence-based common
knowledge semantics for J systems are further enriched by Artemov’s Real-
ization Theorem mentioned at the start of the section. This gives a construc-
tive approach to recovering or realizing the full proof terms of the evidence-
based knowledge systems.
Theorem 4 (Realization Theorem). There is an algorithm that given an
S4Jn-derivation of a formula ϕ, retrieves an S4nLP-formula ψ, a realization
of ϕ, such that ϕ coincides with ψ◦, where ◦ replaces all proof terms with J ,
and S4nLP proves ψ.
This theorem and a realization theorem for S5Jn where J is an S4-modality
is established in [A04, A06] while a realization theorem for S5Jn where J is an
S5-modality is given in [R06]. Other major advantages to justified knowledge
are
• proofs in S4Jn are normalizable ([A04, A06]), but not in S4Cn
• S4J2 is PSPACE-complete [D05], whereas for n ≥ 2, S4Cn is EXPTIME-
complete [FHMV95].
These features have been exploited by Bryukhov in [B05] to develop an
automated theorem prover for S4Jn. Justified Knowledge offers simpler, more
constructive, and more automation-friendly approach to common knowledge.
4 Any Fool’s Knowledge
McCarthy’s model of common knowledge via “any fool knows” apparently
goes back to roughly 1970 ([FHMV95], p. 13), though its first published ap-
pearance is in [MSTI78]. In this epistemic multi-agent system, the modality
for each agent is denoted by S, and the additional virtual agent, “any fool,”
is denoted by O. In [MSTI78] p. 2, whatever any fool knows, “everyone
knows that everyone else knows,” and so someone knows. Thus we may add
an additional axiom linking the fool to the other people: Oϕ → Sϕ. Call
this the linking axiom. This corresponds exactly to Artemov’s connection
principle: Jϕ → Kiϕ. When McCarthy et al. use subscripted modals, Si, to
specify individual agents, S0 is the distinguished any fool operator O. Thus
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we see that the “fool” is a particular agent, hence in any axiom, we may
replace all S modals by Os, though not vice versa.
Definition 8. The McCarthy et al axioms are based on propositional logic
plus:
linking axiom: Oϕ → Sϕ
K0: Sϕ → ϕ
K1: O(Sϕ → ϕ)
K2: O(Oϕ → OSϕ)
K3: O(Sϕ ∧ S(ϕ → ψ) → Sψ)
K4: O(Sϕ → SSϕ)
K5: O(¬Sϕ → S¬Sϕ).
We will look at three systems identified in [MSTI78] given by axioms K0-K3,
K0-K4, and K0-K5.1 These will be referred to as MT, M4, and M5 respec-
tively. Model semantics and completeness results for a variant of M5 is stated
in [MSTI78]. These logics were introduced explicitly to formalize and solve
epsitemic puzzles, of which Wise Men and Unfaithful Wives are addressed
in [MSTI78]. However, rather than borrowing from standard formulations of
modal logics, the authors seem to have developed these particular axioms by
considering just what would be needed for these particular examples. De-
spite this, we can see that Artemov’s justified knowledge operator J plays a
role equivalent to McCarthy’s any fool operator O. In particular, we have
the following theorem.
Definition 9. ? replaces J by O and Ki by Si.
Theorem 5. (TJn)
? ≡ MT and (S4Jn)? ≡ M4 when J is an S4 modality and
(S5Jn)
? ≡ M5 when J is an S5 modality.
Proof. Immediate from the following three lemmas.
Lemma 1. (TJn)
? ≡ MT.
Proof. Recall that J is an S4 modality while the Ki are T modalities.
(⇐) To show (TJn)? ⊃ MT, TJn must satisfy MT axioms (K0-K3 and the
linking axiom), where Os are Js and Sis are Kis.
1In [MSTI78], K0 is omitted from these lists. Given other statements in the paper, this
clearly is just an oversight.
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Linking axiom: TJn ` Jϕ → Kiϕ; the connection principle
K0: TJn ` Kiϕ → ϕ; T axiom for Ki
K1: TJn ` J(Kiϕ → ϕ); J necessitation of T axiom of Ki
K2: TJn ` J(Jϕ → JKiϕ);
1. TJn ` Jϕ → JJϕ 4 axiom for J
2. TJn ` Jϕ → Kiϕ the connection principle
3. TJn ` J(Jϕ → Kiϕ) from 2. by J necessitation
4. TJn ` JJϕ → JKiϕ from 3. by K axiom for J
5. TJn ` Jϕ → JKiϕ from 1. and 4.
6. TJn ` J(Jϕ → JKiϕ) from 5. by J necesitation
K3: TJn ` J(Kiϕ ∧Ki(ϕ → ψ) → Kiψ); J necessitation of K axiom for Ki.
As mentioned above, “any fool” is a particular agent and so in any axiom
all the Ss may be replaced by Os. Consider K0′-K3′ and the linking axiom′
where we do just that:
Linking axiom′: TJn ` Jϕ → Jϕ; propositional tautology
K0′: TJn ` Jϕ → ϕ; T axiom for J
K1′: TJn ` J(Jϕ → ϕ); J necessitation of T axiom of J
K2′: TJn ` J(Jϕ → JJϕ); J necessitaton of 4 axiom for J
K3′: TJn ` J(Jϕ ∧ J(ϕ → ψ) → Jψ); J necessitation of K axiom for J .
(⇒) (TJn)? ⊂ MT. We must show that MT satisfies the (TJn)? axioms and
rules. Remember that “any fool” O is a particular S agent.
S axioms:
K: MT ` Sϕ ∧ S(ϕ → ψ) → Sψ; by K3, linking axiom, K0
T: MT ` Sϕ → ϕ; K0
O axioms:
T: MT ` Oϕ → ϕ; by K0, O is a particular S
K: MT ` Oϕ ∧O(ϕ → ψ) → Oψ; by K axiom for S, O is a an S
4: MT ` Oϕ → OOϕ; by K2, T axiom for O, O is an S
Connection axiom: MT ` Oϕ → Sϕ; the linking axiom
O necessitation: This follows from the fact that each S and O axiom is
nesessitated.
K axiom for S and O is necessitated by K3.
T axiom for S and O is necessitated by K1.
4 axiom for O is necessitated by K2.
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S necessitation: This follows from O necessitation and the linking axiom.
Lemma 2. (S4Jn)
? ≡ M4.
Proof. Recall that J and Ki are S4 modalities.
(⇐) (S4Jn)? ⊃ M4 follows from previous lemma and
K4: S4Jn ` J(Kiϕ → KiKiϕ); by J necessitation of 4 axiom for Ki.
K4′ = K2′
(⇒) (S4Jn)? ⊂ M4 follows from previous lemma and
S axioms:
4: M4 ` Sϕ → SSϕ; by K4, T axiom for O.
O necessitation: 4 axiom for S is necessitated by K4.
Lemma 3. (S5Jn)
? ≡ M5.
Proof. Recall that J and Ki are S5 modalities.
(⇐) (S5Jn)? ⊃ M5 follows from previous lemma and
K5: S4Jn ` J(¬Kiϕ → Ki¬Kiϕ); by J necessitation of 5 axiom for Ki.
K5′: S4Jn ` J(¬Jϕ → J¬Jϕ); by J necessitation of 5 axiom for J .
(⇒) (S5Jn)? ⊂ M5 follows from previous lemma and
S axioms:
5: M4 ` ¬Sϕ → S¬Sϕ; by K5, T axiom for O
O axioms:
5: M5 ` ¬Oϕ → O¬Oϕ; by K5, T axiom for O, O is an S.
O necessitation: 5 axiom for O and S necessitated by K5.
Despite quite different motivations and technical backgrounds, McCarthy’s
“any fool” and Artemov’s justified knowledge approaches lead to the same
multi-modal logics.
Corollary 2. There is a Realization Theorem for MT, M4, and M5 providing
evidence-based semantics for McCarthy’s “any fool” knowledge operator O.
Also, with the addition of an induction rule, these ‘fool’ logics provide
another alternative normal modal axiomatization for [FHMV95] common
knowledge systems, where the common knowledge operator is represented
by an additional axiom schema on the top of the multi-modal version of the
corresponding basic modal logic.
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5 Epistemic Puzzles
Standard epistemic puzzles in the literature such as Wise Men, Muddy Chil-
dren, and Unfaithful Wives, have traditionally been solved using strong com-
mon knowledge systems like S5Cn . By noting examples provided in [MSTI78]
and [A04, A06], we see that justified knowledge can be used to formulate the
same puzzles. In addition, S5 is an unnecessarily strong assumption as multi-
agent T systems are often sufficient. Though [F06] offers common knowledge
solutions via tidy tableau proofs, common knowledge solutions such as ones
offered in [FHMV95], seem to make unwarranted or hidden assumptions,
most notably that each agent in these puzzles has the same Kripke model in
mind. The formalizations, and hence deductive solutions, we can get with
justified knowledge are more satisfying on this front.
These puzzles are structured so that we are given some facts about the
world and some common knowledge assumptions, from which we are to con-
clude some fact about the world or an agent’s knowledge. In particular, a
solution to these puzzles is not a conclusion about whether a proposition is
common knowledge. Schematically these puzzles are of the form χ∧Cϕ → ψ,
where χ, ϕ, and ψ are C-free. In the following section we will see that com-
mon knowledge systems are conservative with respect to justified knowledge
systems on formulas of this form, so that any solution in a common knowledge
system can be obtained in the corresponding justified knowledge system.
We motivated this by two examples: muddy children and wise men. For
classical common knowledge solutions the reader may consult [FHMV95] and
[MvdH95].
Muddy Children
Assume there are n > 1 children playing outside. While they have
been playing, some of them have gotten muddy foreheads. Each
child can see whether the others have mud on their foreheads, but
no one has mentioned it. At some point the father comes out and
announces for all to hear, “at least one of you has mud on your
forehead.” He asks, “Do you know whether your own forehead is
dirty?” The kids answer simultaneously. The question and answer
rounds continue. We will assume that all hear and understand
the father and that all, including the father, speak truthfully.
It is well known that if k ≥ 1 of them are muddy, all the children will
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answer that they don’t know whether they are muddy the first k − 1 times
they are asked. The kth time they are asked, each muddy child will reply
that she knows that she is muddy. The k+1st time they are asked, each clean
child will reply that she knows that she is not muddy.
Consider an instance of this puzzle with three children called 1, 2, and
3, where 1 and 2 are muddy and 3 is clean. We can give the specifications
of this puzzle using facts about the world and explicit justified knowledge
assumptions. There will then be a solution consisting of a formal derivation
in TJ3 using to conclude J-free facts. This approach follows one presented in
[A04].
Let the atomic propositions pi stand for ‘child i has a muddy forehead.’
Binary triples are shorthand notation for conjunctions of pis, e.g. 101 =
p1 ∧ ¬p2 ∧ p3. Kwiϕ is shorthand for Kiϕ ∨ Ki¬ϕ, i.e., ‘i knows whether
ϕ.’ ‘Knowing about others’ is formalized as ‘K.A.O.’ =
∧
j 6=i Kwjpi. As the
children can see the others’ foreheads, we add K.A.O. as an axiom.
The specifications for this problem can be made by describing the initial
state of the world as
L(0) = 110 + J(K.A.O.) + J(¬000).
After the children answer the first question (with a chorus of “No” in this
case), the state of the world can be represented by
L(1) = L(0) + J(¬Kw1p1) + J(¬Kw2p2) + J(¬Kw3p3).
Loosely, after mth round of question and answers,
L(m + 1) = L(m) + J(children’s answers to the mth question).
Now, straight forward derivations, left to the reader, show that TJ3 ` L(1) →
K1p1, T
J
3 ` L(1) → K2p2, and TJ3 ` L(2) → K3¬p3 so that children 1 and 2
will answer “yes, I know” to the second question, and 3 will answer, “yes, I
know” to the third question. Note that these derivations follow the format
χ ∧ Jϕ → ψ mentioned above.
In the specifications above, the state of the world must be calculated by
hand after each question is answered. A related formalization for muddy
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children due to Fitting can be used for automatic updating. This is a slight
reformulation for consistency of notation, the original is in [F06], p. 41. The
reader is referred to [F06] for details.
TJ3 ` I ∧ J(K.A.O.) → (J(¬(J(I) → S)) → Kipi) for some i
Here I is the initial (current) state of the world and S = Kw1p1 ∨Kw2p2 ∨
Kw3p3, i.e. someone knows whether they’re muddy.
By this simple derivation we see that this too, satisfies the paradigm of
χ ∧ Jϕ → ψ:
1. I ∧ J(K.A.O.) → (J(¬(J(I) → S)) → Kipi) Fitting’s Axiom
2. I ∧ J(K.A.O.) ∧ J(¬(J(I) → S)) → Kipi by importation
3. I ∧ J(K.A.O.) ∧ J(J(I) ∧ ¬S) → Kipi propositional reasoning
4. I ∧ J(K.A.O.) ∧ JJ(I) ∧ J(¬S) → Kipi J distributivity
5. I ∧ J(K.A.O.) ∧ J(I) ∧ J(¬S) → Kipi T axiom for J
6. I ∧ J(K.A.O. ∧ I ∧ ¬S) → Kipi J distributivity.
Wise Men
A king has three wise men. It is common knowledge that there
are three red hats and two white hats. The king places a hat on
the head of each wise man so that none sees the color of his own
hat. The king then hides the remaining two hats. He asks the
wise men, sequentially, if they know the color of their own hat.
The first wise man says that he does not know; then the second
wise man says that he does not know. Does the third wise man
know what color his hat is? If so, what color is it?
The third wise man’s hat is red, and he will know this after hearing the
answers of the first two wise men.
As with muddy children, we can formulate the situation and derive a
solution in TJ3 . The set-up and derivations in the following lemma are lifted
directly from [A06], section 8. We will use K.A.O. as in muddy children.
Here, pi will stand for ‘i’s hat is white’. The initial situation can be described
by
L(0) = J(K.A.O.) + J(¬000).
Note that here we don’t include the actual state of world as we did with
muddy children. The situation after the first and second wise men said they
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didn’t know is represented by
L(2) = L(0) + J(¬Kw1p1) + J(¬Kw2p2) .
Lemma 4. TJ3 ` L(2) → K3p3
Proof. First, we prove L(2) → K3(¬100).
1. 100 → K1(¬p2 ∧ ¬p3), from J(K.A.O.)
2. K1(¬p2 ∧ ¬p3) → K1p1, from J(¬000)
3. 100 → K1p1, from 1. and 2.
4. ¬Kw1p1 → ¬100, from 3.
5. J(¬Kw1p1) → J(¬100), from 4., by TJ3 -reasoning
6. J(¬100), from J(¬Kw1p1) and 5.
7. K3(¬100), by TJ3 -reasoning.
Likewise, using J(¬Kw2p2) we obtain K3(¬010).
Next, we prove that L(2) → K3(¬110).
1. 110 → K2(110 ∨ 100), from J(K.A.O.)
2. 110 → K2(110), since J(¬100)
3. 110 → Kw2p2, by TJ3 -reasoning
4. ¬Kw2p2 → ¬110, by propositional logic
5. J(¬Kw2p2) → J(¬110), by TJ3 -reasoning
6. J(¬110), from J(¬Kw2p2) and 5.
7. K3(¬110), by TJ3 -reasoning.
Finally, we conclude K3p3, since K3¬(000 ∨ 100 ∨ 010 ∨ 110), that is,
all combinations with ¬p3 have been ruled out.
From the above proof is it clear not only that the third wise man knows
he wears a red hat, but that he would know this even if he were blind or
otherwise can not see the others’ hats. Note that the above reasoning does
not use Kw3p1 and Kw3p2.
We have seen that both these puzzles man be solved in relatively weak
multi-agent T systems with justified knowledge, moreover, the specifications
for these problems can be given in the form χ ∧ Jϕ → ψ where χ, ϕ, and
ψ contain no J operators. In the following section we have a conservativity
result which will show that for any solution in a C system, there will be one
in the corresponding J system.
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6 Limited Conservativity
A logic T with language L is a conservative extension of a logic T′ with
language L′ ⊆ L if for sentences ϕ of L′, T proves ϕ only if T′ proves ϕ.
Recall the definition for ∗ from Section 3 which renames J to C. As the
logics (S4Jn)
∗ and S4Cn have the same language and yet are not equal, it is
clear that S4Cn can not be a conservative extension of (S4
J
n)
∗, it is however a
conservative extension over all formulas in which C occurs only negatively.
Theorem 6. If ϕ is a formula of S4Jn such that all occurrences of J in ϕ are
negative, then S4Jn ` ϕ ⇔ S4Cn ` (ϕ)∗.
In some sense this result is tight as the induction axiom (ϕ ∧ J(ϕ →
Eϕ) → Jϕ) which distinguishes (S4Jn)∗ from S4Cn has, along with a negative
occurrence of J , a single positive occurrence of J .
Proof. (⇒) is secured by the inclusion (S4Jn)∗ ⊂ S4Cn .
(⇐) This direction is a consequence of the Main Lemma which follows.
We show this direction by proving the contrapositive. Suppose ϕ is a formula
of S4Jn such that all occurrences of J in ϕ are negative and S4
J
n 6` ϕ. By
completeness, there is a model M and a world x such that M,x ° ¬ϕ. By
the Main Lemma, MC, x °C ¬(ϕ)∗, hence S4Cn 6` (ϕ)∗, since MC (with RJ
ignored) is a model for S4Cn .
Lemma 5 (Main Lemma). Let M be a S4Jn-model. Add the relation RC of
reachability along R1, . . . Rn to M and get the augmented model M
C, where
°C coincides with ° on variables, and the modality C corresponds to RC.
Let ϕ be a formula of S4Jn. Then
if all occurrences of J in ϕ are positive, then x ° ϕ ⇒ x °C (ϕ)∗;
if all occurrences of J in ϕ are negative, then x ° ¬ϕ ⇒ x °C ¬(ϕ)∗.
Proof. By induction on ϕ.
Base case is secured by the definition of °C .
Boolean case: ϕ ≡ ψ → θ.
Subcase: all occurrences of J in ϕ are positive and x ° ϕ. Then x ° ¬ψ
or x ° θ. In the former case all occurrences of J in ψ are negative and, by
the induction hypothesis, x °C ¬(ψ)∗. In the latter case all occurrences of J
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in θ are positive and, by the induction hypothesis, x °C (θ)∗. In either case,
x °C (ϕ)∗.
Subcase: all occurrences of J in ϕ are negative and x ° ¬ϕ. Then x ° ψ
and x ° ¬θ. Since all occurrences of J in ψ are positive and all occurrences of
J in θ are negative, by the induction hypothesis, x °C (ψ)∗ and x °C ¬(θ)∗,
hence x °C ¬(ϕ)∗.
Case: ϕ ≡ Kiψ.
Subcase: all occurrences of J in ϕ are positive and x ° ϕ. Then all
occurrences of J in ψ are positive and y ° ψ, for all y such that xRiy.
By the induction hypothesis, y °C (ψ)∗, for all y such that xRiy, hence
x °C (Kiψ)∗, i.e., x °C (ϕ)∗.
Subcase: all occurrences of J in ϕ are negative and x ° ¬ϕ. Then for
some y such that xRiy, y ° ¬ψ. Since all occurrences of J in ψ are also
negative, by the induction hypothesis, y °C ¬(ψ)∗, hence x °C ¬(Kiψ)∗,
i.e., x °C ¬(ϕ)∗.
Case: ϕ ≡ Jψ.
Subcase: all occurrences of J in ϕ are positive and x ° ϕ. Then all
occurrences of J in ψ are also positive and y ° ψ, for all y such that xRJy.
Since RC ⊆ RJ , y ° ψ, for all y such that xRCy. By the induction hypothesis,
y °C (ψ)∗, for all y such that xRCy. Hence x °C C(ψ)∗, i.e., x °C (Jψ)∗,
i.e., x °C (ϕ)∗.
Subcase: ‘all occurrences of J in ϕ are negative and x ° ¬ϕ’ is impossible,
since ϕ ≡ Jψ and the displayed occurrence of J is positive in Jψ.
Corollary 3. If χ, ϕ and ψ are formulas in the language of S4n, then
S4Cn ` χ ∧ Cϕ → ψ ⇔ S4Jn ` χ ∧ Jϕ → ψ.
Proof. As per the theorem, χ∧ Jϕ → ψ has J only in negative position.
Corollary 4. If χ, ϕ and ψ are formulas in the language of Tn and J is an
S4 modality, then TCn ` χ ∧ Cϕ → ψ ⇔ TJn ` χ ∧ Jϕ → ψ.
Proof. Direct consequence of the theorem if main lemma starts with TJn-
models and completeness for TJn.
Corollary 5. If χ, ϕ and ψ are formulas in the language of S5n and J is an
S5 modality, then S5Cn ` χ ∧ Cϕ → ψ ⇔ S5Jn ` χ ∧ Jϕ → ψ.
Proof. Direct consequence of the theorem if main lemma starts with S5Jn-
models and completeness for S5Jn.
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7 Conclusions
Informally, we can consider to C-, J-free formulas as representing facts about
states of knowledge of real epistemic agents K1, . . . , Kn. A standard setup
of a epistemic puzzle consists of certain assumptions about the state of the
world and agents’ knowledge (χ) and common knowledge (Cϕ) whereas the
conclusions are normally made about states of knowledge of real agents (ψ).
It seems that formalization of standard epistemic puzzles can be made
in the form of χ ∧ Cϕ → ψ, hence each time there is a solution within a
Common Knowledge system, there is a solution in the corresponding Jus-
tified Knowledge system. In employing justified knowledge, we make our
assumptions explicit (by giving L(0)) and are able to work with systems of
lower complexity and a nicer proof theoretical behavior (justified knowledge
systems). In practical terms, induction is redundant.
We have also seen that Artemov’s justified knowledge systems are equiva-
lent to McCarthy’s ‘any fool’ systems which were built particularly to address
these epistemic puzzles. This lends credence to applications of J systems to
these puzzles and endows the O systems with a constructive, evidence-based
semantics via the Realization Theorem.
We may also care to consider whether there is there a wider class of puzzles
to which these observations or conservativity may apply and whether there
is a benefit to considering a logic which contains both J and C modalities.
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